peals and many other matters, the SCPR makes certifications related to referrals by Federal Courts or states' appeals courts that have before them matters involving Puerto Rican Law. 4 In civil cases in Puerto Rican courts the judge is the trier of fact. There is no jury. The burden of proof rests with the plaintiffs 5 who are required to mitigate damages using all reasonable means. 6 Failure to mitigate damages will result in a deduction from the award, taking into consideration how much of the damage was due to this omission. Significant negligence by a victim may bring about a reduction in the award. 7 Punitive compensation is not granted in PI and WD cases. 8 Parties may make discovery efforts on any matter related to the litigation not protected by legal privilege, and have the duty to provide information to opposing parties in a timely manner. There is a 60-day period for discovery but the judge may determine a longer or shorter period in accordance with the nature of the litigation. 9 Part II of this article presents key cases of the jurisprudence of the SCPR that provide a framework for forensic economists doing PI and WD damage valuation. The topics covered are the following: the measure and the proof of damages; the persons entitled to economic compensation; the distribution of a WD award; the distinction between economic disability and physical impairment; worklife and natural life; base income; treatment of a claim for income hidden from the tax authority; increases in income; expenses of earning income for the self-employed v. employees; pension benefits; other fringe benefits; treatment of income taxes; personal consumption deduction; present value computation; compensation to disabled minors with no income record; medical and life-care expenses; the collateral source rule; hedonic damages; and loss of household services.
Part III of this article comments on various practice issues, and Part IV has a summary and concluding remarks.
II. The Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
Article 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico establishes that whoever causes damages due to negligent acts or omissions is obligated to provide compensation to the victims. The statutes dealing with damages have been with initials TSPR from http://www.capr.org/avanza/, the website of the Puerto Rico Bar Association. On November 2003, however, we found that access to this last source is now restricted to bar members. A local source for hardcopy or online decisions is Jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo, where cases are quoted using the initials JTS instead of D.P.R. The online site for this last service is http://www.pub-jts.com. 4 For example, Zurkowski v. Honeywell Inc. (1982) and Pate v. U. S.A. (1988) . 5 Cappalli (1977) pp. 250-253. 6 Hardouin v. Krajewski-Pesant Co. (1915 ), Fresh-O-Baking Co. v. Molinos de P.R. (1975 ), Odriozola v. S. Cosmetic Dist. Corp. (1985 and Selosse v. Fundación Ana G. Méndez (1988) . 7 Miranda v. E.L.A. (1994) . 8 Instances of punitive compensation are limited to cases under special statutes such as those dealing with discrimination. Antonio J. Amadeo-Murga, (1997 ) pp. 1199 -1207 . See also Cappalli (1977) pp. 243-244, 286-289. 9 "Los pasos a seguir en tu caso de naturaleza civil," at the web site of the Judicial Branch of Puerto Rico, http://www.tribunalpr.org (2003) . characterized as sparse, so compensation is regulated mainly by jurisprudence. 10 A. The Measure and the Proof of Damages Economic loss due to a tort resulting in the reduction or cessation of a stream of earnings that would have probably occurred in the normal course of affairs is commonly referred to in Spanish as "lucro cesante." 11 It may arise out of wrongful death, disability or default on a contract. 12 Unlike many other jurisdictions, in Puerto Rico the measure of loss is the earnings that the plaintiff could have been expected to receive, rather then the plaintiff's earning capacity.
The computation of "lucro cesante" does not require absolute mathematical precision. A reasonable determination not born out of excessive speculation suffices. 13 Loss determination need not be exclusively based in the formulas of previous cases, since those formulas are only one of the factors to be considered jointly with all the specific circumstances of the case. 14 Therefore, judges have the latitude to ignore the calculations presented by economic experts in order to give precedence to their own calculations or intuitive sense of justice.
The SCPR requires proof of the state of health and income of the victim previous to the alleged damage. 15 Evidence of earnings demonstrates the probability that the victim would have continued his earnings were it not for the damage suffered. 16 Case law states that the testimony of economic experts is not essential, 17 but any expert report must explain its conclusions and provide reasonable arguments. 18 An allegedly disabled victim may be denied compensation if the proof offered is so marred by exaggeration and falsehood that it may be impossible to make a reasonable determination of the degree of disability. 19 
B. Who is Entitled to Economic Compensation?
In WD cases, economic compensation is granted according to the degree of dependency at the time of the damage. Dependents have a claim because they lost a stream of income, and they may or may not be relatives of the victim. Someone who at the time of the damage was not a beneficiary of the interrupted earnings stream has no right to claim losses to an inheritance he could have received in the future. Such compensation is rejected as too speculative. 20 What about the potential loss of support suffered by parents losing children that could have helped them later on in illness or old age? In Travieso v. Del Toro (1953) and Zeno Molina v. Vázquez Rosario (1977) the SCPR recognized the right of a parent to compensation in the death of children, not as heirs to them, but for losing the reasonable expectation of eventual support from them. However, in Pate v. U.S.A. (1988) the SCPR answered a query by the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico that asked if under Puerto Rican Law the parents of a child have the right to compensation for the lost productive capacity of their dead child. The SCPR answered in the negative because the parents were not dependent on the child at the time of his death. The Court made no mention of the loss of potential support to the parents. Time will tell if this closed the door for such a claim.
C. The Distribution of a WD Award
The SCPR has not used any explicit formula for distributing a WD economic award when there is more than one dependent. In one decision, the Court distributed $30,000 giving $14,000 to the widow, $3,100 to an adult daughter, and $4,300 to each of the three minor sons. 21 In another case, the Court split $50,000 equally between two minor sons; 22 in a third case, the Court remanded to a lower court for distribution without offering any guidelines. 23 In the cases where equal amounts were distributed among minors, no mention is made of their ages. Local defense experts sometimes make the error of producing a lower loss estimate when there is more than one dependent 24 because the expert neglects to assign to the other dependents the income flow liberated when one of the dependents ceases to be because of, for example, reaching majority age status. 25 
D. The Distinction Between Economic Disability and Physical Impairment
The SCPR has made the correct differentiation between economic disability and physical impairment. A medical expert assigned a 35% in physical impairment to a car driver injured in an accident. Before the damage, the victim earned $110 a week, and at the time of the trial was at the verge of being employed as a janitor making $80 a week. The SCPR computed the award based on the $30 a week difference, implying a degree of economic damage of 27%. 26 In another case a victim was judged to be unable to return to his work as a construction worker. The lower court awarded compensation as if he were totally disabled, but the SCPR remanded the case recognizing that the victim was able to work in jobs of a different nature. 27 21 Vda. de Delgado v. Boston Ins. Co. (1971) . 22 Publio Díaz v. E.L.A. (1978) . 23 Suro v. E.L.A. (1981) . 24 Apparently they were following a mistake in Brau del Toro (1986) pp. 510-513. 25 We exposed this mistake in Martínez Cuevas (1998 ) pp. 108-116. 26 Velázquez Lozada v. Ponce Asphalt Inc.(1982 . 27 Feliciano Polanco v. Feliciano Fontanez (1999) .
E. Worklife and Natural Life
Up to 1969, economic compensation was granted up to the estimated natural life 28 of the victim. 29 This doctrine was modified when the SCPR shifted to a worklife term for damages. 30 The Court also recognized that compensation to a dependent whose life expectancy is shorter than the productive life of the victim, should be granted based on the dependent's expected natural life. 31 Even though the SCPR has stated that worklife depends on age, sex, occupation, health, origin, habits, idiosyncrasies and other intangibles, 32 in its jurisprudence for adult workers the only explicit worklife terms have been assumed retirement ages of 65 and 70 years.
Use of age 65 as the date of retirement was justified in Velázquez Lozada v. Ponce Asphalt Inc. (1982) by arguing that this was based on the way Social Security benefits were structured. For a number of years now, the age for a full Social Security pension varies from 65 years for those born in 1937 or earlier to 67 years for those born in 1960 or later, but no SCPR decisions have registered worklife terms different from 65 or 70 years. In 2001, a lower court judge rejected one of my calculations based on the Social Security schedule because no SCPR decision has explicitly used it. In 2002, in Rodríguez Báez v. Nationwide, the SCPR accepted a lower court determination using 65 years for an insurance agent. It must be said, however, that this was not a point of dispute in the appeal so the SCPR had no external motivation to revisit this matter.
The SCPR used 65 years of age for an artisan 33 and a laborer, 34 and 70 years of age for a lawyer in private practice. 35 A very curious decision was rendered by the SCPR in Pérez Cruz v. Hospital de la Concepción (1984) where a 70-year retirement age was accepted for a 43-year-old male worker of unidentified occupation, allegedly based on expert testimony using worklife tables from the Federal Department of Labor. Those tables, however, show an expected worklife that is much shorter (about 61 years 36 ) which suggests that the expert testimony offered in this case may have misled the SCPR. This is the only decision of the Court where worklife tables have been accepted. One has to wonder if the acceptance in this particular case was due to the 70 years of age falling within the 65 years to 70 years of age range used in previous cases, without reference to worklife tables. 28 Natural life estimates for Puerto Rico can be obtained from the local Health Department that distributes tables (Abridged Life Tables) made by the School of Medicine of the U.P.R. we are not aware of any worklife tables for residents of Puerto Rico. 29 For example, Vda. de Seraballs v. Abella Hernández (1964) . 30 Rodríguez v. Ponce Cement Corp.(1969) . 31 Zeno Molina v. Vázquez Rosario (1977) . 32 Suro v. E.L.A. (1981) . 33 Vda. de Delgado v. Boston Ins. Co. (1971) . 34 Escobar Galarza v. Banuchi (1983) . 35 Suro v. E.L.A. (1981) . 36 Bureau of Labor Statistics (1986), Base income is usually a recent annual rate of income lost. 38 In a case of a person with a history of variable income, the SCPR allowed an average of the last three years as base income, even though a fourth year was available, and the defendants requested that the SCPR use a four year average. 39 Surprisingly, the average used was not indexed to reflect changes in the price level. The farther back one goes, the more distorted is an average not indexed to account for cost of living changes. The Social Security Administration indexes past earnings for their pension computations but, even though the SCPR has used Social Security's 65 years of age for retirement, we know of no decision of the SCPR that has accepted indexing. 40 
G. Treatment of a Claim for Income Hidden from the Tax Authority
In Negrón v. Municipio de San Juan (1978) a taxi driver suffering temporary disability admitted to not filing tax returns. The SCPR stated that his admission of tax evasion, at the risk of tax penalties, strengthened his credibility. 41 The Court awarded compensation, and relied on the local Treasury Department to impose the pertinent administrative or judicial sanctions. 42 Three years later, in the local landmark decision Suro v. E.L.A, (1981; henceforth Suro) the SCPR allowed compensation for income hidden from taxes by a deceased lawyer, arguing that the survivors were not the ones committing the tax fraud, and that compensation should be based on the truth. The Court notified its decision to the local Treasury Department for the collection of the corresponding taxes and interest, and instructed lower courts to follow this procedure. Brau del Toro has argued that, based on Suro, a victim of PI cannot be compensated for income hidden from the tax authority because it would contravene a doctrine that a person cannot go against his own actions. 43 
H. Increases in Income
In Sánchez v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., (1971) the SCPR approved of increases in income between the date of the damage and the trial, based on legislated salary increases applying to the position of a victim that had been a public employee. In Suro, the Court, for the first time, accepted the probability 37 See, for example, Table 4 of Richard & Abele (1999 ) pp.170-174. 38 Suro v. E.L.A. (1981 ) and Escobar Galarza v. Banuchi (1983 . 39 Rodríguez Báez. v. Nationwide, (2002) . 40 Compare with Ireland et al. (1998) pp. 18, 79. 41 Admissions of this nature are, of course, voluntary since legally a person cannot be forced to engage in self-incrimination. 42 Negrón v. Municipio de San Juan (1978) . 43 Brau del Toro (1986) p. 498. of income increases after the date of the trial due to factors such as increases in education, seniority, productivity and inflation. As an argument in favor of a sustained increase in income, the SCPR quoted statistics from the Economic Report to the Governor by the Puerto Rico Planning Board.
To compute the increases in earnings, the SCPR approved the use of statistics of median weekly salary income in Puerto Rico, published by the local Department of Labor (DLPR). Two years later, it also approved the use of the historical experience of the Federal Minimum Wage. 44 The historical statistical period used in Suro was 22 years for all available industrial groups. This duration was equal to the remaining worklife, up to the assumed retirement age of 70 years, for a lawyer in private practice. In a case two years later, the SCPR accepted a calculation with a historical period of 15 years in DLPR statistics for the specific industrial group in which the victim worked, compared to a 36-year remaining worklife. The annual increases were adjusted downward to recognize that the victim was a seasonal worker. 45 Instead of using a percentage rate of growth based on the DLPR median weekly salary data, the SCPR Suro decision used the absolute dollar average change per year as a fixed annual increase, and without taking into account the differences between the median and the base income of the victim: the diseased lawyer was making $22,500 a year compared to a 1976 statistical median for all industrial classifications of only $4,504. The average annual historical increase in the median was $174.72, which compared to the victim's $22,500 income, produced an initial annual increase of only 0.08%. From the standpoint of economic principles, this is obviously wrong since the increases are grossly insufficient to take into account inflation, not to mention increases in productivity. 46 Also, this percentage becomes smaller every year since we are comparing a fixed dollar increase with increasing levels of income. So the progress achieved by Puerto Rican jurisprudence in recognizing the likelihood of increases in income is marred by the adoption of the faulty economic testimony given by the one economic expert testifying in this case. As a result, for more than 20 years this aspect of the jurisprudence of the SCPR promotes unduly low compensation in cases where victims earned more than the median and vice versa.
I. Expenses of Earning Income for the Self-Employed v. Employees
According to the SCPR, in cases dealing with self-employed persons, tort compensation should be based on earnings from self-employment net of the expenses incurred to earn the income. Consideration should be given to the fact that some of the income produced may be due to the invested capital and not to the productive capacity of the victim. According to the Court, in cases of salaried employees judicial compensation should be based on gross income, which is income 44 Pérez Cruz v. Hospital de la Concepción (1984) . 45 Escobar Galarza v. Banuchi (1983) . The DLPR has added a statistical series showing median weekly salaries for various occupational groups that is more precise in the majority of case applications than the series for industrial groups. 46 Here we are drawing on Brau del Toro (1986) pp. 492-498 and Martínez Cuevas (1995) pp. 90-97. before ordinary and necessary expenses. 47 The personal income tax form in Puerto Rico lists the following ordinary and necessary expenses that are tax deductible: 50% of meals and entertainment, cost and maintenance of uniforms, union and professional association dues, technical books, education expenses, purchase of materials by teachers, and other occupation expenses. These expenses are deductible up to an amount equal to 3% of total salary or $1,500 whichever is lower. In contrast to the mentioned SCPR doctrine, economic reasoning suggests that the listed expenses should be deducted for purposes of tort compensation, consistent with what is done with the legitimate expenses incurred by self-employed people.
J. Pension Benefits
In Suro, the SCPR recognized the value of an employer fully funded pension that the victim would have received in the last seven years of his expected natural life. The computation, however, was a faulty one. Instead of taking into account that the pension was to start after the end of the 22 years of remaining worklife, the decision computes value as if the pension would start in one year, thus producing an unduly high valuation. This mistake has been pointed out in the local literature on the subject 48 and, hopefully, the SCPR will avoid it in the future.
None of the SCPR decisions we have examined about WD or PI have dealt with a claim of losses of Social Security benefits. This may be just as well because in most practical instances there are no losses but gains, since the death or disability triggers an acceleration of benefits with a positive net present value effect, and consideration of gains is precluded by the application of the collateral source doctrine. In most cases there is little or no relationship between the taxes paid by employers for Medicare and Social Security and the benefits employees receive from these programs. 49 Despite this, many local experts give value in their computations to the mentioned employer contributions.
K. Other Fringe Benefits
The SCPR jurisprudence we have examined has not dealt with the loss of fringe benefits such as a health plan provided by an employer. 50 We believe that the Court would not deny a reasonable valuation of such a benefit as matter of 47 Rodríguez Báez v. Nationwide (2002) . 48 The SCPR was not dealing with the reduced pension payments to dependents that may occur because of premature death. What the Court did was a financial mathematics mistake of assuming that, because there is a series of seven level payments starting in year 22, the present value annuity factor applicable at 6% was 5.5824, the one for years 1 to 7. The correct factor is the one for years 22 to 29, 5.5824 * 0.2775 = 1.5491. Brau del Toro (1986) Amadeo-Murga (1997) , in his thorough review of civil jurisprudence in Puerto Rico, states that fringe benefits may be included in an estimate of civil damages but offers no case law citations dealing with health plans, pp. 70-71. basic reparation under the Puerto Rico Civil Code. Local economic experts routinely estimate the value of such non-pension fringe benefits.
L. Treatment of Income Taxes
Unlike the U.S. federal income tax, Puerto Rico's income tax does not exempt economic tort awards for PI and WD. Hence, after 1969, the practice of using after tax earnings as the measure of damages was replaced by the use of before-tax earnings as the measure of lost earnings to avoid double taxation. 51 Since Puerto Rico's income tax is progressive, lump sum awards are subject to higher taxes than the earnings that were going to be received year-by-year, if the injury had not occurred. To adequately compensate the victim, the award should be grossed up to compensate for the adverse tax consequence. 52 However, we know of no SCPR jurisprudence that has dealt with this matter.
M. Personal Consumption Deduction
In death cases, a subtraction from value lost should be made to account for the consumption of the victim. According to standard forensic economic theory, this deduction should take into account factors like the level of income of the victim's family, the number of members in the household and their age. In contrast, the SCPR guidelines have always subtracted one third, in spite of significant variations among cases in the variables mentioned. 53 
N. Present Value Computation
Earnings estimates after the trial date have always been discounted at 6%, but the SCPR has never offered a reasonable explanation for using this fixed rate instead of prevailing rates in the financial markets. In the Suro case, the discounting was made as of the date of the damage with no addition of interest up to the date of the decision. This, of course, is contrary to basic economic reasoning, and implies the use of excessive discounting of earning estimates for the periods before and after the trial. In most cases, however, the SCPR adds losses before the trial without adding or subtracting interest, and discounts only losses estimated for the period after the trial. 54 This shortchanges the plaintiff but to a much smaller degree than what was done in Suro. It is fair to say that in most of the decisions by the SCPR and the most recent ones, the discounting date is the date of the trial.
Another oddity of SCPR jurisprudence is that present value is calculated as if the victim's interrupted earnings stream was going to be a constant annuity, 51 An estimate of taxes was deducted from the award in Vda. de Seraballs v. Abella Hernández (1964) but this changed with Rodríguez v. Ponce Cement Corp. (1969) and Publio Díaz v. E.L.A. (1978) . 52 For a methodology for the computation of the correct tax neutralization amount see Ben-Zion (2000) . 53 Vda. de Seraballs v. Abella Hernández (1964 ), Sánchez v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (1971 ), Suro v. E.L.A (1981 ), Colón v. AFF (1982 ), Escobar Galarza v. Banuchi (1983 and Pérez Cruz v. Hospital de la Concepción (1984) . 54 Sánchez v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (1971 ), Suro v. E.L.A (1981 ), Escobar Galarza v. Banuchi (1983 and Rodríguez Báez. v. Nationwide (2002). equal to the average of future income. 55 For example, if the estimated future income is $20,000, $21,000 and $22,000 for the next three years, respectively, the SCPR methodology would compute the average of $21,000 and discount it as if it were a constant amount for the three years. This is obviously a less precise alternative to yearly discounting and usually overestimates the loss. 56 In practice, some local experts use year-by-year discounting.
It is frequent to find local experts adding interest to past losses, but the only occasion when local judges are expected to do so in tort cases is when they rule that the defendant is guilty of stubborn 57 or excessively litigious conduct known in Spanish as "temeridad." 58 This penalty, like lawyers' fees, is imposed under the local Rules of Civil Procedure (1979) . Law 78 of July 11, 1988 amended the Rules by giving the Commissioner of Financial Institutions of Puerto Rico the power to regulate the interest rate on awards. Under the regulation, a Financial Board fixes interest rates every six months for judicial awards as follows: those against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 6-month Treasury Bill rate; those against other parties, the prime rate plus a punitive premium of 1%. For "temeridad" in tort cases, this rate applies for the period between the moments the lawsuit is filed to the date of the sentence, and for all cases from the sentence date to the payment date. The interest rate is fixed at the time of the judicial decision. 59 In my experience, local judges are well versed in the doctrine of adding past interest only when the defendant is guilty of "temeridad," and will disregard a past interest amount added by an expert that argues it is the right thing to do based on the plaintiff's opportunity cost. On the other hand, we are not aware of a SCPR decision that explicitly rejects a past interest claim based just on economic reasoning.
O. Compensation to Disabled Minors With No Income Record 60
The only instances where the SCPR has used an earnings capacity loss standard is in the case of disabled minors with no previous earnings record. The first case was Ruiz Santiago v. E.L.A. (1985) and the Court proposed the concept of "impairment of the potential to earn income" as different from that of "lucro cesante" that implies a previous earnings record.
The lower court awarded $65,000, but the SCPR criticized the methodology of the expert by saying that he assumed incorrectly that the victim would have finished a minimum education, and would have worked continuously from age 18 55 Suro v. E.L.A. (1981) and Escobar Galarza v. Banuchi (1983) . 56 The Supreme Court of the United States in Jones &Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeiffer (1983) expressed its preference for year-by-year discounting. 57 See Cappalli (1977) p. 279. 58 The Commonwealth Government has exempted itself from "temeridad." 59 Despite an express intent to promote early payment of awards, this structure promotes, among other effects, delaying tactics and later payment of awards by defendants who are paying in the financial market more than the rates established by the Commissioner. For a thorough treatment of this topic see Losey et al. (2002) . 60 In this section we draw on a working paper of ours to be submitted for publication to the Revista del Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico. A draft of the paper was distributed in a continuing education seminar we offered on June 6, 2003, sponsored by the School of Law of the U.P.R.
to age 65 without suffering illnesses or accidents. Viewed in isolation, these comments seem to implicitly endorse for minors the life, participation, and employment approach (LPE) favored by some forensic economists. 61 Instead, the Court was recommending an intuitive conservative estimate on the part of judges which they called a "global approximate compensation." In this approach, value is reduced to reflect the higher level of speculation needed for an estimate that should be careful, moderate, and that avoids a rigid application of mathematical formulas. The Court offered a whole catalogue of factors it considered helpful in this endeavor: type of family, stability of the home, age, health, intelligence, attitudes, study habits, school proficiency, talents, interests, hobbies, dexterities, experience, minimum wage laws, average income of diverse occupations, and average age of retirement.
Also in 1985, the SCPR followed with Rodríguez Cancel v. A.E.E. where the lower court granted $416,708 to a disabled minor, and the SCPR reduced the award to a mere $40,000, without offering a scintilla of methodological light on how they reached this amount. In this case the Court also disregarded a lower court plan to fund with an initial amount of $100,000 a rehabilitation plan for the minor. According to the SCPR the evidence suggested the minor was not susceptible to rehabilitation.
The case of Riley v. Rodríguez de Pacheco (1987) did not deal with the potential economic capacity of a child, but we review it briefly because of its importance for Nieves Cruz v. Universidad de Puerto Rico (2000; henceforth Nieves) . In the 1987 case, the lower court awarded to a minor, partially disabled at birth, $800,000 composed of $500,000 for physical damages and $300,000 for moral suffering. The SCPR reduced the total award by 50% giving the following reasons: in the first years of her life the child could not experience mental suffering; the damages are difficult to estimate; the damages were caused by physicians with the intention of healing not hurting; awards should be limited so they are reasonable and not punitive; and a profitable forensic industry should not hurt the relation between patients and physicians.
In Nieves, the SCPR dealt with the case of a minor who suffered at birth severe and permanent lesions producing physical disability and mental retardation. The lower court granted the following awards: $750,000 for physical damages and mental retardation; $325,000 for impairment of the potential to earn income; and $2,900,000 for life-care expenses. We will analyze this last item in the section that deals with medical and life-care expenses.
The $325,000 award was the most conservative alternative in a report by an economic expert. This alternative considered the probability of unemployment of the average male in Puerto Rico. A second alternative, with an estimate of $500,000, was based on the job history of the minor's father.
A four to three majority of the SCPR reduced all the awards by 50%, based on what was granted in Riley v. Rodríguez de Pacheco (1987) , and objecting to the 70-year natural life span because of the victim's severe physical disability and mental retardation.
The minority opinion argued the following: the majority did not take into account the inflation rate 62 since 1987; the $325,000 and $2,900,000 amounts were already the most conservative amounts before the lower court; the testimony offered about the economic damage, the cost of the life-care plan, and the expected natural life of the victim were not refuted by other experts.
In a research in progress, we applied local income, life, participation, and employment statistics to the Nieves data. We found that by ignoring the probability of labor force participation, the result was close to the estimate of the economic expert in that case. We also found that a LPE approach that assumes that, absent the damage, the child would have earned minimum wage, produces an estimate that happens to be very close to the $162,500 granted by the SCPR. This suggests a conservative bent of the Court dominating the desire expressed in Ruiz Santiago v. E.L.A. (1985) to consider all sorts of socioeconomic information. The $162,500 may seem too low to mainland readers accustomed to working with the statistics of employment and participation in the U.S., but the rate of employment and participation in Puerto Rico are much lower than in the mainland. 63 
P. Medical and Life-Care Expenses
Although the SCPR has recognized the importance of inflation and the time value of money in granting awards for lost income and for awards for pain and suffering, 64 we have been unable to find SCPR jurisprudence that applies these concepts to medical or life-care expenses to be incurred in the future. 65 We already mentioned how in Nieves the SCPR cut the $2,900,000 life-care compensation by 50% citing previous jurisprudence, and disregarding expert testimony about the expected natural life of the child. From an economic standpoint, there was an obvious need to increase the annual $50,000 to reflect inflation, and to discount the results to present value. However, no such procedure was included in the decision.
Q. The Collateral Source Rule
When third parties make payments to a victim, collateral source rules determine if they are deductible from the legal compensation payable by a defendant. The SCPR has stated that the deduction of side payments may vary 62 For many years, inflation figures in Puerto Rico have been unreliable because since 1977 the DLPR has not made an income and expense study to revise the basket of goods used for cost of living statistics. There is now a study in progress that may correct this situation. Since Puerto Rico is a region of the U.S. economy, I have been using in my expert reports inflation figures for the mainland by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. 63 From 1990 to 2001 the range of both sexes participation rates in Puerto Rico varied from 45.4% to 48.1% compared to 66.2% to 67.1% for the U.S. The corresponding average unemployment rates in the island were 10.5% to 14.3%, compared to 4.0% to 7.5% in the mainland. Website of the Economics Department of U.P.R., http://www.rrp.upr.edu/uie (2003) and U.S, Census Bureau (2002) p. 367. 64 For example, Rojas v. Maldonado (1948) and Vélez Ex rel González v. Atlas Line (1955) . 65 We asked attorney and author Antonio Amadeo-Murga about this, and he also has not found any such case.
between cases according to the origin or purpose of the collateral source. 66 In WD or PI cases, life or disability insurance compensation may not be deducted under the SCPR interpretation. The reason given is that the premiums paid are unrelated to the tortfeasor. The SCPR specifically states that in these cases the resulting double compensation should not be a concern.
In Nieves, the minor disabled at birth had received treatment paid by the State of Florida. The Court affirmed the collateral source doctrine saying that, in general, payments by third parties are not deductible from damage awards. Such is the case with public services unrelated to the tortfeasor, and the Court added that the victim could not be condemned to depend on public assistance. Only future estimated life-care expenses were included in the award.
Puerto Rico has a no-fault auto accident insurance program, administered by a government agency known by its Spanish initials as ACAA. Its compensations must be deducted from awards for pain, suffering and loss of income. This is appropriate since the ACAA insurance is compulsory and, in all likelihood, the vehicle driven by a guilty party paid the insurance premium. Even if the plaintiff failed to apply for ACAA benefits, there is an automatic deduction of $1,000 from pain and suffering awards and $2,000 for other compensations such as for loss of income. 67 
R. Hedonic Damages
In Cintrón Adorno v. Gómez (1999) the SCPR stated that loss of enjoyment of life, also known as hedonic damage, is not payable to the survivors in a WD case. The victim cannot be aware of such loss, and therefore it is not a real loss. The only losses claimable are the economic loss to dependents, the physical and mental suffering of the victim while he was alive, and the suffering of the survivors. According to the SCPR, if it recognized the loss of enjoyment of life, it would also have to recognize the avoidance of the sadness and afflictions of daily life with the difficulty of having to measure their respective proportions.
S. Loss of Household Services
The SCPR has recognized the value of home services in, for example, matters dealing with the division of common property of a married couple, 68 but to our knowledge it has never valued them for purposes of WD or PI litigation. With increasing frequency, economic expert reports include this item, and, hopefully, an appeal to the SCPR in the near future may provide judicial guidance in this matter.
III. Practice Issues
There are a number of practice issues with which forensic economists working in Puerto Rico should be aware. First, opposing counsel rarely challenges the qualifications of an economic expert. When such a challenge is made, judges usually choose to hear what the expert has to say, and express confidence in being able to determine the weight that should be given to the expert's testimony. Second, an expert should avoid direct attacks on the credibility or quality of another expert, as judges may view such attacks as a sign that the expert lacks neutrality and objectivity and may have a personal agenda against the other expert. Third, trials get suspended frequently in Puerto Rico and these suspensions may extend for many months. Fourth, attorneys in Puerto Rico frequently contact experts as a last resort when settlement efforts have failed. Fifth, judges are increasingly requesting the assistance of a third expert, payable by the litigating parties, to help the judge in evaluating the reports of the two opposing experts. Finally, most attorneys request a report that follows a methodology that has been accepted by the SCPR case law. This reduces the chance of appeals to the SCPR that may result in improving jurisprudence.
IV. Summary and Concluding Comments
We see that the jurisprudence of the SCPR has many differences with accepted economic principles and practices elsewhere: the loss standard for adults is not earning capacity but lost earnings; claimants need not be relatives of the victim; assumed ages of retirement of 65 or 70 years of age are used instead of statistical worklife tables; increases in income are fixed amounts not adjusted to the specific base income of the victim; the discount rate is 6% and is independent of the rates prevailing in financial markets; present value is computed as if the victim was going to earn a constant annuity equal to average income during productive life after the trial; there is no prejudgment interest except as a punishment imposed by the judge for excessively litigious behavior; income taxes are not deducted because economic awards are taxable; income fraudulently hidden from tax returns may be considered for an award; ordinary and necessary expenses are deducted only for business owners and self employed people and not for salaried employees; personal consumption has been always one-third no matter the level of income, the number of dependents or spouse income; lost earnings capacity is the standard for disabled minors, and awards have been very conservative.
Areas where the SCPR jurisprudence is similar to many other jurisdictions are the following: plaintiff has to prove damages; reasonable discovery, including depositions, is standard; adjustments are made for shared negligence; mitigation efforts are required; the collateral source doctrine is prevalent with some exceptions; and hedonic damages are rejected in WD cases. Loss for household services is an item that the jurisprudence of the SCPR has not explicitly accepted or rejected.
The principles and practices that forensic economics has developed and keeps developing are undoubtedly of great help in promoting fair awards that provide justice to plaintiffs and defendants. The many instances of divergence between these principles and practices and the jurisprudence of the SCPR suggest there is great need for appeals that compel the Court to deal with many issues. The conservatism of the SCPR reduces the probability of successful appeals, which, in turn, retards the pace of change. Plaintiffs, defendants, and their lawyers bear part of the blame for this state of affairs by reluctance to appeal which denies the Court the opportunity to review many matters that need change. The challenge is there, and all concerned should accept it.
